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30
rules, if any, are not controlling when an atypical situation arises."
It would seem, therefore, that the majority in the principal case
is in accord with the English decisions31 and with the New York
trend3 2 which hold that the terms of admission are far from conclusive as to the capacity of an alien to acquire a domicile. The principal case, in treating Gosschalk as a domiciliary for the purpose
of obtaining relief from domestic difficulties, is consistent with the
decisions which open our courts in civil actions to aliens who are in
the United States illegally.3 3 The majority opinion justifiably adopts
the view that a person who enters the United States on a temporary
visitor's visa is not precluded, as a matter of law, from acquiring a
new domicile of choice.
JOHN R. ALFORD

HABEAS CORPUS USED TO SUPERVISE LOWER COURTS
Mr. Finefellow, an influential and aggressive supporter of a candidate in a local election, is arrested less than a week before election
day and charged with forgery. He claims that the charge is not only
unsubstantiated but a political plot designed to defeat his candidate
in the forthcoming election. Although eligible for bail, he desires
an opportunity to prove his innocence and clear his name before the
election, fearing that he may not have obtained even a preliminary
hearing by that time. A malicious prosecution suit, coming as it would
after the election, would be of little value. In similar circumstances
the relator in Commonwealth ex rel. Levine v. Fair1 petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, relying on a unique rule long established in that state,
held that the writ should issue and discharged the relator.
This represents a material extension of the writ as applied by
°Note, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 640, 642 8, nn.9, 10, 11, 12,13 (1942).
31See note 26 supra.
32jacoubovitch v. Jacoubovitch, 278 App. Div. 1027, 112 N.Y.S.2d i (2d Dep't 1952);
Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2d Dep't 1949);
Townsend v. Townsend, 176 Misc. 19, 26 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Greiner v.
Bank of Adelaide, 176 Misc. 315, 26 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gray v. Gray,
143 N.Y. 354, 38 N.E. 3oi (1894).
33Arteaga v. Allen, 99 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1938); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines,
17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936); Janusis v. Long, 284 Mass. 403, 188 N.E. 228 (1933);
Feldman v. Murray, 171 Misc. 360, 12 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
1394 Pa. 262, 146 A.2d 834 (1958).
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most American courts. It is generally agreed that habeas corpus
is available only to test the jurisdiction of the restraining authority.2
In the principal case the relator was arrested on a properly issued
warrant based on an information duly sworn to and filed.8 The constable's jurisdiction to hold him seems clear. Under such circumstances the writ will normally be denied unless there is a total failure
to allege an offense to the law or unless the act charged does not
constitute an offense due to the unconstitutionality of the statute
under which the prosecution is brought.4 Otherwise it is feared that
every man who considers himself improperly arrested would sue out a
habeas corpus, thereby disrupting the ordinary processes of the law. 5
The facts in the principal case are such that under these rules there
can be no relief by habeas corpus.
Although observing the general requirement that habeas corpus
is limited to an attack on the jurisdiction of the restraining authority,
some courts would be able to grant the relief required in this situation.
Alabama has held that "a prisoner, who is in custody simply on a
warrant of commitment, issued after preliminary examination, and
before any indictment has been found, can, when brought on habeas
corpus before a proper officer, claim as a matter of right that such
... 6
officer shall hear and pass on all legal evidence which he offers.
The Alabama statutes then in force provided that the defendant
must be discharged if no offense appeared to have been committed
or if there was no probable cause for charging the prisoner with an
offense.7 A far greater obligation is thereby imposed upon the court than
under the general rule, which allows the prisoner's discharge only where
no offense known to the law is alleged. Where the writ is sought after
trial, however, Alabama is in accord with the general rule that this
collateral attack on the proceeding will lie solely to test jurisdiction.8
225 Am. Jur. Habeas Corpus § 13 (194o); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (1944).
3146 A.2d at 837-38.
'39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 20 (1944); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 85, 86 (1928).
'It is reasonable to assume that this practical consideration is one of the reasons
for the restrictive policies which limit the use of habeas corpus. It is eloquently
stated in Ex parte Davis, 107 N.J. Eq. 16o, 152 At. 188, 191 (Ch. 1936). This argument is discredited in the principal case. "If a procedure is authorized and justified
under the law, it is no argument to say that such a procedure would place a
burden on the courts .... Justice is not limited by the size of the courtroom and
freedom is not measured by the strength of a judge's back." 146 A.2d at 838.
GEx parte Mahone, 30 Ala. 49, 50 (1857).
7The statutes then in force are quoted in part by the court. Id. at 5o , 51. This
provision is now found at Ala. Code tit. 15, § 24 (1940).
"Bray v. State, 14o Ala. 172, 37 So. 250 (19o4); Ex parte Bizzell, 112 Ala. 210, 21
So. 371 (1896).
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Wisconsin provides relief without relying upon any particular
statutory authorization, 9 but the rationale, in the light of modern
legal development, is suspect. 1 The Wisconsin courts seek to honor
the requirement that habeas corpus must attack the jurisdiction of the
restraining authority, 11 but the Wisconsin Supreme Court's view of
jurisdiction is not in accord with the prevailing authority, under
which jurisdiction is defined in terms of power to deal with the general type of case at hand.12 The Wisconsin rule has been stated to be:
"Where the circuit court possesses jurisdiction in the broad sense of
the term, but ought not to exercise it in the way invoked, or at all in
the given circumstances, it should be deemed, to all intents and purposes, except in the sense of want of power strictly so called, to be
without jurisdiction."'13 It follows that a Wisconsin court is authorized
to examine the evidence upon application for habeas corpus prior to
trial and, if it is found that the committing magistrate acted upon
evidence, which in its most favorable form did not justify the commitment, to hold that the error is jurisdictional and that habeas corpus
is the proper remedy.' 4
The Supreme Court of California appears to advocate a frank
departure from the strict rule that habeas corpus is available only to
test the jurisdiction of the restraining authority. 15 This court points
out that habeas corpus has been repeatedly utilized where a prisioner's
constitutional guarantees have been violated even though the trial
court's jurisdiction was conceded, and notes the use of the writ in
"other situations ... to review a question of law that cannot other-

wise be raised or is so important as to render the ordinary procedure
inadequate."' 16 A careful examination of the authorities relied on
indicates that the California court's approach is not yet widely sanc9'The current Wisconsin statutory provisions are similar to those of Alabama
in that they allow the prisoner's discharge on habeas corpus "if no legal cause be
shown for such ... restraint...." Wis. Stat. § 292.20 (1O57). However, no case
appears to have construed this statute as liberally as Alabama has interpreted its
statute.
10

The Wisconsin view of jurisdiction is similar to the view employed by the

Illinois Supreme Court in their original report of Collins v. Collins, appearing
in the advance sheets at 15o N.E.2d 361 (1958). The jurisdictional point was subsequently modified in the permanent report. 14 Ill. 2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958).
See comment on the case at p. 255.
"Ex parte Cash, 215 Wis. 148, 253 N.W. 788 (1934).
25o

C.J.S. Jurisdiction 1o89, lO91 (1947).

"Harrigan
v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N.W. 9o9, 934 (1904).
14
State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 11o Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1o46 (igol).
"See Portnoy v. Superior Court, 2o Cal. 2d 375, 125 P.2d 487 (1942).
1
8Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal. 2d. 488, 122 P.2d 22, 26 (1942).
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tioned. This approach that does provide relief to a petitioner who
ordinarily would be without relief, such as the one in this case, merits
consideration.
Pennsylvania issued the habeas corpus in the principal case under
an old rationale quite different from any of these theories. An examination of the authorities cited in Commonwealth ex rel. Levine v.
Fair indicates that the fundamental legal basis justifying the issuance
of the writ is the supervisory power of the court over lesser courts and
magistrates.
In an early case, Gosline v. Place,17 the petitioner was jailed upon
the finding of a county judge that he was disposing of his property
in fraud of creditors. He obtained a writ of certiorari to bring the
proceedings up for review and then applied also for a habeas corpus
to obtain his immediate release. The court denied the habeas corpus,
pointing out that "there is sufficient evidence of fraud, to justify a
requisition on him that he shall give bail to purge himself of the
fraud in the regular way ...."Is The use of the writ, however, was expressly sanctioned in the following language of the court:
"If a habeas corpus at common law issues, and the return to
it shows that the prisoner is held by virtue of proceedings in
a court, or before a magistrate, over which the court issuing the
habeas corpus has a supervisory authority, the said court may
issue a certiorarito bring up the record; and may thereupon
hear and decide the case, or review and correct the proceedings,
in order to give efficacy to the writ of habeas corpus. If a certiorari be issued to bring up a case into a higher court for hearing
or review, the court may also issue a habeas corpus to bring up
,19
the defendant ....
In Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall,20 also relied
on in the principal case, a soldier, guarding a private home in an
area affected by strike violence, and in the execution of his orders, shot
an intruder. Upon a finding by a coroner's inquest that the shooting was
"hasty and unjustifiable," he was arrested, but successfully petitioned
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas corpus:
"This court, either sitting as a committing magistrate or by
virtue of its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of all
subordinate tribunals.., has the authority and the duty, on
habeas corpus in favor of a prisoner held on a criminal charge,
2732Pa. 520 (1859).

"Id. at 528.
'"Id. at 524.
2 ,o6 Pa. 165, 55 Ad. 952

(1903).
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to see that at least a prima facie case of guilt is supported by
the evidence against him .... If the case was before a jury, we
should be bound to direct a verdict of not guilty, and to set
aside a contrary verdict if rendered." 21
Notwithstanding the authorities cited by the majority opinion
in Commonwealth ex rel. Levine v. Fair which support in general
terms the proposition that habeas corpus is available to secure a
prisoner's liberty in extraordinary cases, the primary legal rationale
for the use of the writ rests upon the court's superintending control.2 2 This is an ancient concept dating back to the time, shortly
after the Norman Conquest, during which the King did, in fact, sit
in the King's Bench.23 Although the assizes and other inferior tribunals were separate and independent in their general functioning,
they were, of course, always subject to the overriding mandates of the
monarch, and the King's Bench retained this supervisory jurisdiction
after it ceased to be directly controlled by the Grown.2 4 The concept
of appeal and error developed from this superintendence by the King.
There also developed a "jurisdiction to amend 'misdemeanours extra
judicial,' partly by its process of contempt, but chiefly by means of the
'25
prerogative writs."
A similar power of superintending control has been granted to
the high courts of many of the states by their constitutions, and it
is also said that the power is inherent in the supreme tribunals of
those states that have adopted the common law.2 6 The Supreme
2 7
Court of the United States, in Kendall ex rel. Stokes v. United States,
commented:
"And the power to issue this writ in this case, mandamus is
given to the King's Bench only, as having the general supervising power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, and is
co-extensive with judicial sovereignty. And the same theory prevails in our State governments, where the common law is
adopted, and governs in the administration of justice; and the
power of issuing the writ is generally
confided to the highest
28
court of original jurisdiction."
'Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 2o6 Pa. 165, 55 Ad. 952, 957-58

(1903).
'For a comprehensive examination of superintending control and its status in
the various states up until the turn of the century see Annot., 51 L.R.A. 33 (191o).
2"2 Bacon's Abr., Courts and Their Jurisdiction in General (A) *95; 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries *41.
24 Holdsworth, History of English Law 211-12 (1931).
mId. at 226.
4Annot., 51 L.R.A. 33, 34-35 (19o).
"37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 594 (1838).
2Id.
at 621.
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Habeas corpus was one of the early high prerogative writs 29 and

was utilized by the King's Bench in the exercise of its superintending
control. 30 American courts, however, apparently have been reluctant
to issue this writ in assistance of their supervisory powers, such control usually being carried out through mandamus, prohibition, and
certiorari. 31 Alabama, oddly enough in view of the fact that under
that state's statutes the petitioner is entitled to present evidence to show
lack of probable cause for detention, appears to be one of the few,
if not the only jurisdiction with a historical rule similar to that of
Pennsylvania. 32 In Ex parte Croom & May, 33 petitioners were improperly held on a charge of murder until after the close of the term
of court, and upon being denied bail by a circuit judge, they petitioned
the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari and habeas corpus. This
court issued the habeas corpus under a rationale not unlike that of
the Pennsylvania court in Gosline v. Place, holding it to be the
court's duty to adopt a practice which would assure its complete
control in the exercise of a "general superintendence of inferior jurisdictions ....

-34 The correct practice was said to be for the prisoners

"to petition this court for the writ of habeas corpus, and such other
remedial process as shall be necessary to render its control effectual .... 35 in this instance certiorari.
Although the occasion may be rare that a man, unjustly imprisoned, is without adequate relief under the law, Commonwealth ex
Cohen, Habeas Corpus Gum Causa-The Emergence of the Modem Writ, 18
Can. B. Rev. 1o (194o); Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q.R. 64 (19o2).
'9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 1o9-11 (1926). Blackstone states, "Indeed, if the party were privileged in the courts of common pleas and exchequer, as
being an officer or suitor of the court [King's Bench], an habeas corpus ad subjiciendum might also by common law have awarded from thence...." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *131.
-"See the authorities grouped by states in Annot., 51 L.R.A. 33, 37-70 (1901). The
commentator therein remarks that not only is the use of habeas corpus in the exercise of superintending control rare, but also illogical, because it is addressed to
an individual, rather than to the inferior tribunal. Annot., 51 L.R.A. 33, 38 (1901).
The control exercised, however, would appear to be quite effective where it serves
to remove the prisoner from the control of the inferior court. It may also be noted
that when habeas corpus has been so utilized, it has often been in combination
with some other writ, i.e., certiorari. Holdsworth notes an instance as early as 1412
where certiorari was probably used with a habeas corpus cum causa to defeat the
proceeding of an inferior court and further comments that this convenient method
was probably abused in that "unscrupulous and litigious age." 9 Holdsworth, supra
note 3o, at 1o9.
mAnnot., 51 L.R.A. 33, 38 (g°o).
n19 Ala. 561 (1851).
71Id. at 566.
c--bid.

